The forum began with Fritz Bolkestein, who made it clear that he become disillusioned with the EU. He made the argument that the EU is moving in the wrong direction with the Lisbon Treaty. Bolkestein pointed out that the European Council, where heads of state convene to determine big policy initiatives, has now become an official institution, which will significantly increase the already bloated bureaucracy. While he pointed out more specific problems, his main issue was with the Parliament and the lack of democracy in the EU. Bolkestein concluded stating that the EU is “a bunch of unelected bureaucrats.”
Dr. John Gillingham spoke last, but he made similar arguments to Bolkestein. Gillingham believes that the EU has spiraled out of control and become a government that does not serve its intended purpose. He believes that EMU has been disastrous and granting the EU fiscal powers will not remedy the recent crisis from happening again. The way to fix the EU is through structural reform that allows flexibility. This flexibility will come through bilateral treaties, which seems to stem from Andrew Moravczik’s theory of interngovernmentalism. Gillingham concluded that he does not know if this is possible, but there are things about the EU worth saving, like the single market, and therefore reform is necessary.
Dr. Pangratis faced tough opposition representing the EU. His defense was that the EU is necessary to govern the complexities of a modern world. If you compare the bureaucracies of the U.S. and the EU, the EU employs only 30,000 people, a fraction of the U.S. federal government, and more comparable to a state’s civil service. Gillingham refuted this by stating the EU does not provide services, like mail or building roads, that governments typically provide. Pangratis acknowledged that the EU must address the democratic deficit.
You cannot discuss the EU without discussing the democratic deficit. So why hasn’t it been addressed? The Lisbon Treaty attempts to do this, and is mildly successful, although not to the critics. The Parliament and the Council now act similarly in most legislation as the House and Senate in the U.S, forming a bicameral legislature. And new citizens’ initiatives have been introduced, where a percentage of the populous can compel the Commission to introduce legislation. Going into all the mechanisms would be lengthy and has been written about extensively, so I will go into any more depth here.
As Bolkestein and many scholars point out, the Parliament has many inherent problems. Voter turnout has declined steadily since the first direct elections in the 70s. Voters also use these elections as “second order” elections, punishing or rewarding their domestic government. If they are unhappy with the Socialist government, voters will vote liberal in the Parliament elections, or for another party. So how can this be fixed? Peter Maier has pointed out that parties are no longer capable of representing the people of Europe. Simon Hix, who has also written extensively on the democratic deficit, believes there needs to be more direct democracy introduced, such as direct participation in electing the Commission president.
An idea that has constantly arose in my mind is, would changing the system of proportional representation to a system of single member district plurality introduce more direct democracy to the Parliament? I had the opportunity to ask both Peter Maier and Simon Hix this question. Maier believes that this could be a possible solution, while Hix does not believe that this will do much because districts would be so large and diverse.
I believe changing the system from proportional to single member district would not introduce democracy to the EU, but rather input legitimacy. The EU already possess a high amount of output legitimacy through the consensus that it reaches through its complex legislative process, there is usually no direct loser in European politics. It lacks input legitimacy, where citizens directly participate in government. This is a stark difference between the U.S. and the EU, where the U.S. has a high degree of input legitimacy, but low output legitimacy. The U.S. system is one of a winner takes all. When Republicans win, Republican policy measures benefit their supporters, and punish Democrats. The EU attempts to introduce legislation that is acceptable to all major parties.
How can the democratic deficit be fixed? By forgoing one type of legitimacy for another. Switching types of legitimacy would be a fatal blow to the integration process. Single member districts will introduce the problem of pork barrel and log rolling into the Parliament. Other measures to increase input legitimacy will allow more say from a largely Euroskeptic European public. Bolkestein is correct to point out that there is no opposition government in the Parliament, but polarizing the Parlimanet along party lines will lead to legislative gridlock or a system that benefits winning parties and punishes the losers, a far cry from the system of governance the EU has a become, a system based on consensus. Single member districts also tend to produce two party systems like in the U.S, while proportional representation allows for more parties to enter into the government.
So which type of legitimacy is “better?” This is the question. The idea of democracy is government by the people. This would lead one to believe that democracy has degraded in Europe because the average European has little direct influence on the supranational government. However, democracy with input legitimacy sometimes allows for some very undemocratic outputs. This is evident when an elected majority produces policy that punishes the minority. Both the U.S. and EU forms of governance have their flaws. Which system is better equipped with the tools to address the complexities of the modern world? Only time will tell, but European economies seem to be faring the current crisis better than the U.S.
It interesting that you mention the question of input vs. output legitimacy. I don't believe any of the panelists touched on the system of interest representation (i.e. lobbying) or on new modes of governance, but chose to limit their evidence as to the EU "going in the wrong direction" to poor voter turnout and representatives that are too far separated from the citizens (the problem of input legitimacy).
ReplyDeletePangratis said that he sees the EU as still the best way to deal with modern complexities despite the "democratic deficit," yet he did not elaborate. I would have liked to see him defend some of the processes so key to the EU's OUTPUT legitimacy, that is, mention the open method of coordination as a tool being used in solving issues such as unemployment, emphasizing a best practices approach. To an American audience, it was necessary to emphasize that a lack of input legitimacy might not, unequivocally equate to a lack of output legitimacy. "Power grab" has a very negative connotation to Americans... truthfully, it may not have the same meaning to Europeans.