A four (to five) year vacation: Why the market for higher education is too perfect in the U.S.

I have always envied Europe's little to no cost higher education systems. While I envied it, however, it always amazed me that such a system was sustainable. With recent tuition hikes in the UK and the ensuing protests, it shows that nothing good lasts forever.

So which system is better? One where education is funded by taxpayers or one where students pay their own way? Because of my current circumstances I’d be inclined to want taxpayers to pay off my debt, but this is unsustainable and most importantly inefficient.

I have little knowledge of comparative higher education systems, but can’t help myself from attempting to answer this question.

Let’s start with full disclosure. Under the American system, I have easily been able to obtain loans to pay for my extremely high education costs. I was lucky enough that my parents were able to pay for my first two years as an undergraduate, while I took out personal loans to pay for the last two years and my year of graduate school. This has totaled to somewhere around $100,000, half provided privately and half by the government.

$100,000! This is an amount of debt that I can hardly comprehend and honestly seems surreal. But, it is not all that uncommon and many of my friends have incurred similar levels of debt. We are trying to pay off a mortgage before we have a house.

A typical European will incur nowhere near this amount of debt and in countries like Sweden higher education is practically free of costs. 

To examine this question I'll call on, quite possibly my favorite book, The Undercover Economist by Tim Harford whose lessons in economics can easily be applied to higher education. The first is that a free market reveals the truth.

Privatization of higher education in the U.S. has revealed student preferences perfectly. So perfectly that universities have moved away from their original mission of education provision to provision of other services. The increase in recreational facilities, football stadiums and cafeterias that rival four star restaurants clearly shows that students prefer these goods/services over education.

How do we know this? Because universities compete amongst each other to enroll the best students and to attract the best they must respond to student demands. And what we have been demanding is more of a Club Med experience rather than modest facilities filled with the best professors money can buy.

This brings us to our first problem: excessive-signaling or advertising by colleges and universities. Karsten Mause (2009) reviews the academic literature and remarks on this concept determining that effective tools to measure the effect excessive-signaling has on social welfare have yet to be developed. 

I fell victim to signaling. The picturesque campus of my university sold me. I was still unsure what I was going to major in, but couldn't resist the thought of spending four years on such a beautiful campus and ignored looking into universities that held the highest reputation for what I was interested in studying. I am not saying that everyone is as gullible as me and likely to succumb to signaling as I am, but it without a doubt plays a factor. I also value my education and experience at my university very highly, whether or not I value it at $100,000 is yet to be seen.

Onto other problems. Harford points out three market failures that afflict healthcare that also hold true for higher education: scarcity power, externalities, and adverse selection caused by asymmetric information.

Scarcity power is not that troubling. Potential students have so many choices when it comes to selecting a college or university that it is overwhelming. The rise of online institutions has made competition even fiercer, providing yet another option.

To make competition perfect, the accreditation system could be removed. This would affect the marginal price as institutions could offer lower quality, cheaper education outside accredited colleges and universities, increasing supply. It would be then up to employers to recognize and investigate the value of a student's education if they attended one of these marginal institutions.

Next let’s look at how externalities impact higher education. When a person obtains a degree they create a positive externality for society as a whole by increasing human capital. Externalities and public goods (see older post) are not properly priced in an open market, so government intervention is needed. Negative externalities, such as the traffic that a new football stadium brings to a town, should be taxed, while positive externalities should receive a subsidy, evident when a person studies immunology and helps develop HIV/AIDS treatments. 

How much of a subsidy should be given to a person that invests in their human capital? This is the most difficult question to answer. European states have chosen to subsidize this cost much like the U.S. does for primary and secondary education. The U.S. subsidizes higher education differently. Both public and private higher education institutions exist and receive a fair amount of federal and state funding, but this funding is then redistributed on a need basis. The most common subsidy comes in the form of low fixed rate loans, the type of aid I received. 

The question of how much to subsidize investment in human capital is closely linked with the third market failure, adverse selection.

When applying to colleges and universities there are many different people and organizations that have to act as actuaries and attempt to determine risk, including you. First, you have to evaluate the riskiness of taking out a loan, choosing the right school, etc. and try to determine if this going to pay off through increased job opportunities. The school admissions office also has to look into the material you submit with your application: high school transcripts, SAT scores, essays, etc. and evaluate whether you are going to be an academic flop or star and increase the school’s prestige. Lastly, there are financial organizations that decide whether you eligible for federal aid based on need. If not, and you decide to apply for private loans, banks must try to predict the future and determine whether or not you will be able pay off the money they are lending you.

Adverse selection occurs because we lack an important technology, crystal balls. The private sector will underinvest in human capital because it cannot be sure, especially since most potential students are unsure of what they want to major in, that the person will be able to repay their debt.

Complete private financing of higher education will lead to discrimination against some disciplines. Mine, political science, will likely go the way of the dinosaurs under such a system; banks simply won’t finance disciplines that don’t lead to the most profitable careers. Students who choose engineering, medicine, and other “hard” sciences will receive the most financing.

Exploring some possible solutions...

1. Excessive-signaling

This is difficult to solve since there is no effective way to measure the impact signaling has on social welfare. A cap could be set on expenses that aren’t directly related to increasing teaching and research capacity. The government could also compel institutions to spend an equal on signaling and those that  add value to education. In both cases, a large increase in spending that adds value to education would occur as institutions competed with one another. It would be more difficult for the institutions to compete by buying commercials or recruiting a star basketball player because of the caps.  The only place left to compete would be on teaching.

Its also hard to determine what expense are signaling and what are adding value to education. Does a state of the art dorm facility, that makes living conditions more comfortable, increase the productivity of students?

2. Externalities

It’s difficult, but not impossible (see average earnings for persons with degrees) to evaluate how much a degree should cost. Harford points out we shouldn’t subsidize something that the market can regulate. People will continue to seek college degrees because of the increased income they will receive. People who otherwise wouldn’t seek an education require a subsidy to push them into the market, since this will increase social welfare by raising human capital. This is how the system currently works, on a need basis. While the poor are largely left out, this is a poverty problem, not a problem with the system.  

3. Adverse selection

Under a completely private financing scheme, some disciplines will lose, and the less privileged will find it difficult, if not impossible, to find financing. Banks, with no knowledge of your future, will be less inclined to invest in human capital, which will lead to under investment, a fact of the U.S. system (Jacobs et al., 2006). Jacobs et al. (2006) suggest a graduate tax. This would act exactly like an income tax, and be used to fund higher education. A radical change I cannot see coming to fruition in the U.S. or Europe.  With more and more people attending higher education institutions, it would also be unsustainable.

Which system better deals with these issues? U.S. institutions consistently dominate world rankings. Whether this is because of the way the system is structured or our overall wealth will be revealed as the developing world catches up and it becomes easier to study abroad. But, the more market based approach in the U.S. leads to a highly competitive, and as we’ve seen probably too competitive, market that will push colleges and universities to offer the best services, education or other, at the lowest cost.  The European system, on the other hand, looks as if it is going to shift closer to the American way, as a shrinking population cannot afford the huge subsidies that colleges and universities receive.

While it has flaws, the U.S. is the clear victor.

For now the focus should be on determining the effect that signaling has on social welfare. I have a feeling (intuition, no empirical evidence) that the massive inflation of higher education costs has a lot to do with excessive signaling. If this can be measured, it can be fixed, and the other, more difficult problems can be dealt with accordingly.  

References

Jacobs, Bas and Sweder van Wijnbergen. 2006.”Capital-Market Failure, Adverse Selection and Equity Financing of Higher Education.” Public Finance Analysis 63 (1): 1-32.

Mause, Karsten. 2009. “Too Much Competition in Higher Education? Some Conceptual Remarks on the Excessive-Signaling Hypothesis.” American Journal of Economics & Sociology 68(5): 1107-1133.

Who you gonna call? Ashton..Barroso…Van Rompuy…Merkel?

You would be hard pressed to find anyone in Europe who has anything to do with the EU that hasn’t heard this quote:

          "Who do I call if I want to call Europe?"—Henry Kissinger

My education in Europe afforded me the opportunity to meet with many EU officials, interest representation organizations, and academics. I am not exaggerating when I say that almost every person brought up this question posed by Kissinger.

A leaked diplomatic cable available on WikiLeaks and reported on by the EUObserver here, highlights why Europeans have an obsession with this question. In a cable reporting on a meeting between the U.S. and former external relations Commissioner Chris Patten from the UK, Patten states that the EU will never be a real power because it is not willing to unilaterally implement policy that the rest of the world considers unwise, like the U.S.

The Lisbon treaty was Europe’s attempt to solve the Kissinger question. What it accomplished, however, was increased confusion. The treaty created a new Council president, Herman Van Rompuy was chosen for this post, and a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton holds this post. The treaty did not do away with the rotating Council presidency in which a member state holds this post for six months.

The treaty effectively created more phone numbers to dial when trying to call Europe. The Commission President was a clear supranational leader pre-Lisbon. Now who should the U.S. call? Ashton, Van Rompuy, Barrosso, Belgium (who holds the rotating presidency), or just negotiate bilaterally through member states?

Without a clear foreign policy leader, as is the case with the president in the U.S., the EU will never be a “real” power as Patten describes because member states will negotiate their own foreign policies. When you want to negotiate with the United States, it is clear who to contact. It is unnecessary to contact all branches of the government or individual states. When you want to negotiate with Europe, why go through the hassle of figuring out who to call, when you can just dial the individual member states whose leaders are clear.

Many have been quick to criticize the appointment of Van Rompuy as a “straw man” who can be controlled by the member states. In a recent rant by Member of Parliament Nigel Farage, he stated Van Rompuy has the “charisma of a damp rag” and “the appearance of a low-grade bank clear.” While this is an overstatement, he clearly isn’t a charismatic figure who is willing to further a European foreign policy agenda, Farage, a Euroskeptic should appreciate this.

It comes down to the fact that to pass foreign policy legislation, voting in the Council requires unanimity. This is something that has not changed with the Lisbon treaty. Lisbon moved many Justice and Home affairs issues to the “community method”( which only requires a qualified majority in the Council) and extended the Parliament the power of codecision in all areas but foreign policy. Extended codecision has made the legislative process similar to a bicameral legislature. While this is a large generalization the Council now operates like the Senate and Parliament as the House of Representatives.

Lisbon also created the European External Action Service (EEAS), a diplomatic corps to serve European goals. Ashton will be in charge of this new service. How the EEAS will look is still not clear. They are set to move into their new headquarters in Brussels shortly.

Will we see European delegations replace those of the member states? I don’t imagine this will happen anytime soon. But, if I were a German or UK citizen in these tough economic times, I wouldn’t mind seeing my embassy in Ulaanbaatar shut down in lieu of an EEAS office that would handle the affairs of all Europeans. Currently an EU citizen can use the services of another member state (an Estonian can use a German consulate) in countries where they have no diplomatic presence. This offsets huge costs for small member states like Malta and Estonia, who just can’t afford to have the world wide diplomatic presence that the UK and Germany have.

There is no doubt that there would be benefits if the EU could establish an effective foreign policy. This is most evident in the WTO where it negotiates as a single entity making it an extremely powerful player because of the bloc’s combined trade. The EEAS can also help to offset the large cost of maintaining a global diplomatic presence for both large and small member states. Will foreign policy ever fall under the community method? This is hard to say, but before this happens, fiscal union is needed to save the bloc first.

With threat of euro collapse, remember what European integration has achieved

Every news source over the last few weeks has published articles on the Irish bailout and the eminent demise of the euro. For the first time, I am also becoming skeptical that the single currency will weather the next few years.

It was the Greeks in May, the Irish now, and Portugal and Spain in the near future that have/will require an EU-IMF bailout. This year has been an “I told you so” moment for many economists, a lot of whom are American.

For those not familiar with the issue, the crux of the problem lies in the PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain) inability to devalue their currency (see Paul Krugman’s article) Devaluation is a practice that the U.S., UK and what China has effectively been doing for over a decade, engage in to make their exports more competitive. If New Jersey had its own currency, say the Lire (to serve stereotypes) it could devalue the Lire relative to other state currencies instead of enacting the tough budget cuts that it is currently imposing. The PIIGS must implement even tougher austerity measures to cut their debt and save the euro.

Austerity is a problem form both an economic and political standpoint. Cutting spending when it is needed the most (to spur the growth needed to climb out of the crisis) can lead to a downward spiral of no growth or contraction that will eventually result in countries defaulting on their debt. This is something many economists are predicting will happen in Europe. Politically, this will cause many politicians to question the value of the Euro as the public protests budget slashing, as seen in Greece.

Fiscal union could save the euro. Supranational control over member states’ budgets would allow the EU to function like the U.S. Greece and Portugal would become as much of a threat to the euro as New Jersey is to the dollar. This will not happen. Germany is terrified of its wealth being transferred to these fiscally “irresponsible” states and the fire that drove integration up to this point has fizzled out with Euroskeptics becoming increasingly powerful domestically and in the European Parliament.

The end of the euro will come with a series of protests: Protests against austerity measures in the PIIGS and German protests against taxpayer money saving the PIIGS from default.  

What implications will this have for the EU? I can only hope the integration project will not unravel and in this time of crisis it is important to remember all the EU has accomplished.

All the benefits of the single market aside, let’s not forget the original purpose of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the predecessor of the EU. The ECSC, formally established in 1951 by the Treaty of Paris, created a common market for coal and steel, the two main resources needed to conduct war. France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands were all party to the treaty. A supranational institution, the High Authority, was created to oversee the market. With the means to make war under the control of the ECSC’s High Authority, war between the six states became impossible.

My generation takes this for granted. We have the luxury of being born after wars tore apart Europe, and as all living veterans slowly pass on, so does the first hand memory of the horror that was World War II.

However, out of this horror sprung something truly remarkable in the ECSC. Like WWII this is a historical precedent that we must not forget. The ECSC took two countries that had a primordial hatred, a continent that was ripping itself apart through brutal wars of the likes the world had never seen, and brought them so close that in less than 50 years war in Western Europe was and is unimaginable.

I find this feat of peace to be a more important lesson than the devastation of world war.

I look to the EU as a microcosm for what world governance could eventually look like; I do not think this is some sort of utopian dream. The close relationship that is now shared between Germany and France can only be compared to a union in 50 years between India and Pakistan, or Iraq and Iran. Although there were a unique set of circumstances that allowed for the formation of the ECSC, that are not present in these hypothetical examples, the history of war between European states is often overlooked, and the ECSC is short changed in the history books.

The EU has reached the limits of integration and adopting a single currency before fiscal union has been a mistake. Like WWII and the ECSC, the single currency now serves as a lesson as the world inevitably becomes more integrated and competencies that were once at the state level creep upward into institutions like the WTO and the UN. I believe that future generations (not near future) will look back on the WTO and conclude that it was world economic integration that eradicated interstate war, just like the ECSC did for Europe. European integration is a political experiment and just because it was too bold and may fail in establishing a single currency in no way means it is a failure.

What is the future of the EU if the euro collapses? I don’t have the answer and the future of the Union is more uncertain than it ever was. But let’s stop for a minute, put the bickering about the future aside, and remember that it could be worse. The French and Germans could still be killing each other.   

ReSTARTing problems for the U.S. and Europe

What is the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)? It is pomp and circumstance that restores Russian nostalgia to a day when they were our military equal. Now, they simply aren’t. The new treaty will reduce American and Russian strategic (intercontinental) nuclear weapons from about 2,000 to 1,500, still enough to undoubtedly annihilate an enemy and uphold the principle of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).  This new treaty may be blocked during the lame duck session of Congress by Republicans who have voiced concerns over ratification and want to deny the Obama administration a victory. This is a huge mistake for the U.S. and also has negative implications for Europe. 

In an article in Proliferation Analysis by James Acton, Acton mentions that a concern of Republican Senator Jon Kyl over the treaty is the huge stockpile of Russian tactical (battlefield) nuclear weapons and the threat it poses to our European allies. Has anyone bothered to ask the Europeans what they think?

France and the UK both posses a limited but capable nuclear arsenal, serving as a direct deterrent against Russian nuclear aggression in the region. According to the Federation of American Scientists the combined arsenal of France and the UK amounts to around 525 warheads, again enough to obliterate an enemy state.

On a side note, I had the privilege to visit Hiroshima this year for the 65^th anniversary of the dropping of the atomic bomb on the city. From visiting museums, the peace ceremony and listening to a survivor I can say with assurance that the devastation that one of these weapons can bring is truly unimaginable.

With their own capable nuclear force, how does Europe benefit from an arms control treaty between Russia and the U.S.? Through increased stable and predictable relations. Ask any European if they are more concerned about Russia using a tactical nuclear weapon against Lithuania or whether Russia can meet European gas demand and the answer will be gas. Russia is known from time to time to shoot itself in the foot with its policies but they have yet to come close to committing suicide. The use of a tactical nuclear weapon on European soil would surely be suicide.

Robert Kagan points out in an article in The Washington Post that the failure to pass START will do nothing but empower Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. As we have seen over the past 10 years a powerful Putin leads to an aggressive Russia. When Russia bullies its neighbors the U.S. suffers by losing ground in its foreign policy goals and Europeans suffer by freezing to death without gas to heat their homes.

While Russia no longer poses a direct military threat to the U.S. and EU it can still cause a major headache when it is ignored (the recognition of Kosovo has led to the continued Russian occupation of Georgia).

Conceding to START obligations, something the outdated Russian nuclear arsenal needs, will give Russia the political room to make a concession that will benefit the U.S. and EU. The U.S. “reset” policy with Russia has proven successful in the past by enabling UN sanctions against Iran, pointed out in both articles. Failure to pass START will end this reset.

Closer ties between the U.S. and Russia will foster a stronger EU-Russia relationship. Kagan also points this out, stating that Russia will demand concessions from Europe if START fails because the U.S. has undermined the Russia-transatlantic relationship and Europe will be the one who must pay to mend the ties.

Putin is still in power because he has vouched to restore Russia to the world power it once was. The arms race between the U.S. and Russia is a treasured Russian claim to international fame. An example: In the past decade the U.S. developed the world’s largest conventional bomb nicknamed the "Mother of All Bombs." This was soon followed by development of a bigger Russian bomb called the "Father of All Bombs." Necessary? I think not.

Russia’s illusion of grandeur is its greatest weakness. Appeasing Russia by acknowledging that it is our military equal, which is all the New START does and in no way makes us less secure, is a small trade off for the possible benefits that both Europe and the U.S. can reap from a stronger relationship.

More pomp and circumstance summits and treaties like START that play to Russia’s vanity are needed. Letting Russia believe it is on par/winning the arms race with the U.S. will benefit both countries and all in between.  Foreign relations have always been tit for tat and giving Russia back its sense of military prowess is something the U.S. can easily concede. How long will Russia repay the West with a tat? Who knows? But this is no reason to abandon the reset policy.

Unfortunately, the recent shelling of South Korea by the North is another nail in the coffin of the New START. It gives Republicans another excuse to delay ratification because of the nuclear threat in the Yellow Sea. Unlike Russia, the North Koreans seem willing to play Russian roulette. 

How to spot an American at the airport

I want to weigh in, briefly, on the controversy of “enhanced” pat downs and body scanners at American airports. Over the past week this has consumed 24-hour news channels; it seems almost every person who flew in the past week has been interviewed. I thought I’d contribute to the media hysteria and post regarding my personal experiences.

When I lived in Europe the sure fire way to identify a fellow American at the airport was to look for the people taking their shoes off. Taking your shoes off to go through airport security is not required at European airports. Personally, I have never had an unpleasant experience flying anywhere, but I have found differences in the attitudes of security officials and one experience in Europe particularly stands out.

When I entered the Schengen Zone for the first time through Zurich and made my way through security as I changed terminals, I made the mistake of taking my shoes off and was quickly informed that this was not necessary. As I walked through the metal detectors I was selected for a pat down. The security official approached me and asked “Deutshe or English?” When I replied, “English” he said “congratulations, you’ve been selected.” I was taken to a booth with a curtain where we both joked about the pat down.  This was not an enhanced pat down that the TSA now performs in the U.S.

Next, I made my way to passport control. Here I was asked if my grandfather was Swiss because of my last name and had a brief chat about my heritage. The official then told me I was going to enjoy Florence and to have a nice trip. Both of these experiences lightened my mood and made my travel experience on that long day very pleasant.

All TSA agents are not grumpy and are just regular people trying to do their jobs. Also, I’ve had my fair share of unpleasant European officials, but a lesson can be taken from my experience in Switzerland.

I am not familiar with TSA training, but my intuition tells me that interpersonal skills are not the focus. This training leads to a guilty until proven innocent attitude and this is what needs to be reversed. This attitude compounds the stress of an already stressful process that many people are not used to.  Travelers should not feel like they are under arrest when they are going through airport security.

It is a difficult counterfactual experiment to estimate how many terrorist attacks would have occurred without increased security measures. The TSA can stop attacks through both prevention and deterrence. I am not opposed to these increased measures, but sympathize with people’s frustration. Some people are recommending profiling, as is practice in Israel, and this would be wrong. We do our best in the U.S. to build a free, secure and equal society and profiling would be a step backwards.

TSA officials, for the most part, are dealing with people, not terrorists. Their training should focus equally on this fact with security. More “how are you todays” and “enjoy your trips” can go a long way. I think we’d be amazed at how willingly people cooperate when asked politely and feel it is their choice rather than compulsory. The solution is simple: remind the public that security often has a price that is freedom and do it with a smile on your face. 

What do the Common Agricultural Policy, National Security, and Renewable Energy Policy have in common?

In a recent poll, The Economist recently posed the question “should tariffs and subsidies for biofuels be ended?” The vote was overwhelmingly “yes.” Biofuels are subsidized and protected by tariffs in the U.S. and, which The Economist fails to bring up, are also propped up by policy in the EU. First generation biofuels are the most controversial of renewable energy sources (RES) because food crops are used to produce fuels like biodiesel and ethanol. Second generation biofuels use non-food crops, such as corn stalks, and third generation use algae that secrete a fuel; both of these technologies are presently not viable.

Moving away from biofuels specifically and looking at RES policy as a whole, policy has developed along a significantly different track in the U.S. than in the EU. The EU has passed comprehensive climate change legislation known as the 20/20/20 directives. These three directives set EU wide goals of 20 percent of energy consumption to come from RES, a 20 percent increase in energy efficiency, and a 20 percent reduction in carbon emissions.  A binding quota (or goal such as Malta’s 10 percent) is outlined in the RES directive for each member state that takes into account current RES infrastructure and other economic factors. Individual state quotas were the result of much compromise; originally the directive compelled all member states (MS) to reach 20 percent.  

The reduction in carbon emissions will be met through a cap-and-trade scheme. Licenses that permit carbon emissions were originally issued by the MS, but recently this has become supranational competency.

How member states reach their RES quotas by 2020 is up to them. Some member states have adopted renewable portfolio standards (RPS) (discussed next), but the biggest success story has been the feed-in tariff, a German policy innovation. Under a feed-in tariff system RES producers are guaranteed a premium price on electricity based on the mode of production; solar receives the highest premium because of its high cost. Producers are guaranteed this price for a pre-established amount of time which encourages small entrepreneurs to invest in RES. Electricity transmission operators, who buy electricity from production facilities and transmit it to consumers are required to buy all RES electricity. Many other MS have followed the German example and adopted a feed-in tariff system, such as Spain, and all MS are currently on track to meet their RES quotas.

No federal RES or climate change legislation has been passed in the U.S.

But..

More than half of U.S. states have adopted RPS, alternative portfolio standards (AEPS) or renewable/alternative goals. RPS schemes are the most common. Alternative refers to an expansion of the allowed energy sources that are included in the portfolio, and goals are voluntary. Under RPS/AEPS schemes states compel electricity suppliers to buy a certain amount of electricity produced from RES or alternative sources.  California has the most ambitious portfolio aiming to consume 33 percent of electricity from RES by 2020. Information on all 50 states can be found here.

Which policy has been more successful? EU states that have adopted feed-in tariffs rather than RPS have proved the most successful in promoting RES, in particular Germany and Spain. Feed-in tariffs encourage entrepreneurs to invest in RES, while RPS favor incumbent energy companies and the academic literature shows that feed-in tariffs are much more successful in RES uptake.

Since feed-in tariffs have proven their merit, is this the way toward a RES powered future? Feed-in tariffs have a lot in common with the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). CAP has the reputation as being the world’s most inefficient agricultural policy; it is much larger than the U.S.’s farm bill and the second largest item on the EU’s budget. But what is often forgotten is what CAP achieved. CAP helped transform a continent that was incapable at feeding its population, into a continent that now produces agricultural surplus. A simple way of saying this is that CAP provided Europe with food security.

Food security has a lot in common with national security. Both are a pure public good which means they are non-excludable and non-rivalrous.  It is nearly impossible to exclude a citizen from the benefit that the good yields, and if one citizen consumes the good, it does not reduce the benefit from the good another citizen receives. The most commonly used example is air quality. Public goods have always been a problem in economics and it is pertinent to remember this economics basic when developing RES policy.

Increased RES will provide a public good to the U.S. and EU through increased energy security and reduced air pollution, leaving out the hotly debated climate change argument. While feed-in tariffs could, in theory, achieve 100 percent energy production from RES, the downfalls of CAP must also be looked at.

CAP has created a system of concentrated benefits and diffuse costs causing the farm lobby to become the most powerful interest representation group in Europe. Because feed-in tariffs establish a like system by guaranteeing profits for a certain period of time, rent-seeking will occur. The RES lobby could potentially rival the farm lobby in the near future under such a system. RPS on the other hand attempts to use a “market” solution, but have so far been ineffective, especially in encouraging investment from outside the big energy companies.

So what policy should be adopted? Neither. What is needed is an effective way to price carbon and other pollutants and green house gases (GHG) because they are “public bads.” Whether you agree with climate change or not, carbon, and GHG produce a public bad. RES produces a public good, through energy independence, something the EU and the U.S. should strive for. Public goods need to be protected while public bads need to be punished through public policy. The most effective way to do this would be to tax public bads, like carbon, which would effectively establish a price. This price should be proportional to the public bad it produces and because carbon and GHG are global public bads, international solidarity on the price is needed.

The U.S. should be a strong proponent of establishing a global price on carbon; our export mix has been consistently moving away from heavy industries that produce more carbon. The EU on the other hand, who is the world leader in RES and climate change legislation and sought international solidarity at the Copenhagen Summit, would be hurt more than the U.S. if a price were put on carbon because their export mix is heavier.

Many Americans have been fine with 20 percent of the budget going towards supporting the public good of national security, although this now may change. Why not agree on a price for carbon and GHGs to increase the competitiveness of RES that will in turn increase energy security? Countries that do not adopt the price can be punished through raising a tariff equal to the price of carbon on their goods. Establishing this price will without a doubt be difficult and I do not have the answer. But it is not impossible. Pricing public goods and bads is difficult but necessary because it is something the market does not provide.

Without effective prices, public goods will deteriorate while bads are produced at no cost. This is: Why it is illegal to pollute water sources, the cause of fishery policy, and the reason for clean air legislation. It is time that energy security and self reliance is taken seriously and promoted through an effective, federal, and eventually international (so no country achieves an advantage because of no carbon tax), policy that prices this public bad. If the U.S. and the EU could agree on such a policy the rest of the world would follow suit.

Punishing Obama: Second-order theory and similarities between EP and American midterm elections

Today, Americans go out to vote in the midterm elections (all 435 House and 37 Senate seats up for grabs halfway through President Obama’s tenure). Most political outlets are predicting that Republicans will take control of the House, and possibly even the Senate. The key word here being possible because everyone is attempting to predict the election, but it will all come down to how many people actually go out and vote.

European Parliament (EP) elections are the subject of much controversy in Europe. The EP is the only directly elected institution and elections are plagued by low voter turnout. It is important to remember that the electoral system used by the EU is proportional rather than single member district like in the U.S. In a proportional system voters select a party on a ballot rather than a person. That party then receives an amount of seats in the parliament proportional to the number of votes they receive. A threshold of votes must be reached for a party to receive seats, eliminating the possibility of parties with less than 1 percent of the vote from entering government. This system favors the entrance of smaller parties into government, while single member district systems traditionally produce a two party government.

Simon Hix and Michael Marsh sum up existing research on EP elections and come to insightful conclusions in their article “Punishment or Protest? Understanding European Parliament Elections.” Hix and Marsh conclude that a minor proportion of voters cast their ballot in protest against the integration project and find that most voters are subject to the “honeymoon effect.” The honeymoon effect affects elections by causing voters to reward a ruling party shortly after national elections by casting their ballot for that party in EP elections. If the honeymoon is over with the national government and the public is unhappy with the ruling party, they will punish this party during EP elections by casting their ballot for different parties. Along with timing (the honeymoon effect), second order theory states that the governing and the largest parties will lose seats during second-order contests.[i]

Research has shown that second-order theory largely holds true for EP elections; can any of these principles be applied to American midterms? It appears that the three principles of second-order theory are having a large impact on today’s elections. The honeymoon with President Obama is over halfway through his term. The Democrats have held power in Congress since 2006 and are therefore the largest party in government. With unemployment close to 10 percent the public is looking for new solutions to solving the Great Recession.

Disdain with Democratic handling of the recession has given birth to the anti-government Tea Party movement. As I compiled sources on the Tea Party, which I originally was going to post about, I became confused about exactly what they stand for and the funding of the movement has come under increased scrutiny. Rather than discuss that here, it is best to wait and see how many Tea Party candidates succeed in getting elected to public office. Fringe parties, similar to the Tea Party, fare better in EP elections as voters have the “luxury of supporting smaller parties that may seem irrelevant in a national election where government formation was a salient issue.”[ii] In the midterms, a presidential election is not at stake, and is not the salient issue, so voters have the luxury of supporting movements like the Tea Party. 

Midterm predictions all point toward results that hold true to second-order theory. Republican takeover of the House and the Senate will be a clear indication that the public is unhappy with President Obama and is punishing his administration by voting against Democrats. It is currently debated whether this will lead to gridlock or increase compromise between the two parties. 

I can only hope, that if this happens, we take a lesson from our neighbors across the Atlantic and choose compromise.

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[i] Hix, Simon and Michael Marsh. 2007. “Punishment or Protest? Understanding European Parliament Elections.” The Journal of Politics: Vol. 69 No. 2 pp. 496.

[ii]Ibid, 506. 

Trends #European Union: The power of microblogs

Over the past two years there has been an explosion in the number of microblogs, mainly through the websites Facebook and Twitter. These bits of information, hence the name “microblog”, give status updates and short commentary from a user that is viewable by all of the user’s friends or followers. Microblogging grew an astonishing 1400 percent from 2009-2010 and Twitter now sees over 50 million “tweets” per day.  Twitter and Facebook are free to use, easy to set up and accessible not only through a computer, but also through applications on mobile devices, providing the possibility for the entire public to microblog.

Marketing firms have jumped the opportunity to use this medium to campaign and conduct research for their clients. It is almost impossible to find a celebrity or politician who has also not begun to capitalize on this publicity tool. Almost all of the traffic that comes through this blog are people redirected from Facebook. These new media tools can generate what seems like limitless publicity for a person that uses these networks to their full potential. Google and the Library of Congress have begun to catalogue microblogs and you can now search on Google for “updates” which narrows your search strictly to microblogs. When this information becomes easily accessible through Google and Library of Congress, it will provide a vast, largely untapped, wealth of information.

Microblogs are extremely useful in exploring public opinion because of their widespread audience and ease of access; in 2010 everyone has become a journalist.  While gathering newspapers, blogs and television transcripts in the U.S. regarding the EU for May 2010, I also wanted to explore tweets. I doubted there have been or ever will be a day when #European Union becomes a trend shown on the Twitter homepage.

To explore this issue a search was conducted every day for tweets containing the phrase “European Union.” Each tweet was then logged and broken down into two categories: containing links and not containing links. A sample was also collected of information regarding the users who were tweeting about the EU. Total number of tweets, location and number of followers for the user were gathered.  The total number of tweets will give insight into total exposure on Twitter and the sample of users will provide a profile of the users who bother to Tweet about the EU. Tweets containing links will show the relationship between Twitter and other online media, such as blogs and newspapers.

In May Twitter users tweeted about the EU an average of 264 times per day. With over 50 million tweets per day, the EU accounts for .0005 percent of total Twitter traffic. Almost all of these tweets were links to other articles, indicating a strong relationship between the microblogosphere and other online media. A similar problem arises, that also came up when analyzing other media (see post) in determining if this is a high level of exposure relative to other similar subjects.

Establishing a profile of a user that tweets about the EU was an extremely difficult task. The variance in the number of microblogs users have tweeted since they joined the site was extreme: the mean was over 9,500 and the median was 2,953. If the median is used as the average, it would mean that users tweeted twice a day for the four years that Twitter has been in existence. This is staggering, and a wider sample of users must be looked at to explore why the variance was so high.

The number of followers was also examined because of the implications this has on determining total exposure. If a user has 1,000 followers, 1,000 other users will see this tweet on their phone, computer or Twitter equipped device, compounding the level of exposure. Again, there was a huge amount of variance in the sample. The median amount of followers a user had was 359. With an average of 264 tweets per day, and 359 people viewing each of these tweets, 94,776 Twitter users are viewing tweets about the EU daily. This number is possibly inflated because a single user who followed multiple users’ who tweeted about the EU was not accounted for. This number, however, vividly shows the influence that a microblogging site like Twitter possesses.

Lastly, the location of the user was examined. This was taken into account as there was no way to search for only users that are located within the United States. Tweets were limited to English, but this obviously will not narrow the results to only the Anglo-Saxon world. This was also the most problematic part of the study because listing your location is voluntary. Users do not have to disclose their location, can create a fictional location, or even lie that they are located somewhere they are not.

Keeping these limits in mind, the results were at follows. Over 35 percent of user locations could not be identified. Users that listed their location within the U.S. made up a little over 29 percent and both the EU and countries outside the U.S. and the EU, categorized as “Other,” accounted for around 18 percent. It would be interesting to conduct a similar study with an expanded search to include the additional 22 languages of the EU. I am doubtful that including 22 more languages would yield many more tweets, due to the fact that most EU specific news sources are published in English, and most tweets contained links to outside media.

Does the EU receive high exposure on Twitter? Again this is difficult to say relative to other subjects, but looking at the huge volume of tweets per day, it can be concluded that the EU composes a minute proportion of daily traffic. Twitter and other microblog sites produce a vast amount of information every second that can be exploited to look into the public’s opinion on a wide variety of subjects. This strictly quantitative study is only a rough exploration of a new form of media that is going to play an important role in future research, in not only political science, but across all disciplines. 

Thank you for smoking, polluting, and speculating

Many people saw the movie Thank You for Smoking that gives a glimpse into the life of a tobacco lobbyist whose smooth talking can sell people products that inevitably lead to their deaths. Lobbying itself has become a dirty word. Instead "interest representation" or "advocacy" are used. Big oil, big sugar, big tobacco are all terms carrying a negative connotation used in the U.S. to describe massive organizations within an  industry that pour money into lobbying efforts. The U.S. public possesses a stereotype of lobbying in Washington, but is the perception of lobbying in Brussels similar to the U.S.?

I was drawn to the topic of interest representation by an article in the EUObserver discussing the website http://www.worstlobby.eu/ and the award it is granting for the worst lobbying organization in Brussels. The nominees are divided into two categories: finance and climate. Among these nominees are American hedge fund Goldman Sachs, for “aggressive lobbying to defend their financial weapons of mass destruction” and ArcelorMittal, a steel company, for “lobbying for CO2 cuts under the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) and at the same time raking in windfall profits under the ETS.” It’s important to note however, that this campaign is run by opposing interest representation groups, like LobbyControl, Friends of the Earth Europe, and Spinwatch.

The European public has a history of skepticism towards lobbying organizations in Brussels, similar to the American public. Public outrage against government support of the financial sector is evident in the surging popularity of the Tea Party movement in the U.S. But there are some stark differences between the EU and U.S. Differences that exist because of federalism in the U.S. and the multi-level governance in the EU.

In the EU the most important lobbying actors are the member states themselves. Germany, France, the UK, etc. drive policy, rather than the executive or Congress. Interest groups have the option of “venue shopping” in the EU, where they can choose at what level of governance to dedicate resources. Even with interest groups focusing on member state governments, the most important actor, there has been an almost exponential increase in interest organizations in Brussels after the Singe European Act in 1986. The EU also differs from the U.S. because it engages interests through compromise due to the consensus based governance it has come to represent. The U.S. represents a “winner takes all” system[i], a zero sum game, where one interest is clearly the victor over the other. If big oil wins, the environment loses.

In the U.S. it is clear that governance structures will not change; this is not a given in EU, which is perpetually evolving. Therefore it is much easier for organizations to establish best practices and stick with them. Interest groups concentrate themselves in Washington because that is where the most important actors are located, not the case in the EU. In January the Supreme Court issued a ruling that has made it unconstitutional to ban interest groups from directly funding political advertisements during election campaigns (see Economist article) because it violates the First Amendment.

This ruling will certainly have an impact on political campaigns, but transparency is the major issue. This ruling will change little if the public knows that it is a coal company paying for an advertisement to support a legislative candidate promoting an increase in coal fired power plants. The same goes for renewable energy as well, although this is perceived as a “good” policy, rather than bad.

Perception is the main difference between the EU and U.S. Both public's are skeptical of special interests lobbying for concentrated benefits created through public policy, and are concerned about the public’s lack of involvement because the costs imposed are diffuse. However “good” and “bad” policies are perceived differently across the Atlantic. This is evident most clearly in environmental policy. During a meeting with Green Peace in Brussels I attended with my classmates, a question was raised asking if Green Peace suffers from an image problem in Europe. The question was answered “no” and the subject was immediately changed.

This was something myself and American classmates could not get over. From discussion afterward we came to the conclusion that Green Peace in the U.S. is viewed as having more in common with Al Qaeda than an NGO. This is obviously not true for all, or most Americans, but the perceived image in undoubtedly different. This sheds insight on perceived “good” and “bad” policies because the EU has shown, through substantial legislation, that it is going to do what it takes become an environmentally friendly continent. The federal government has take little action compared to the EU and the public in general is much more skeptical to the benefits that green policy measures can bring.

Is it easier for special interests to capture U.S. government institutions than the EU’s counterparts? That is a difficult question to answer, and lobbying is debated and studied extensively in the academic literature. Christine Mahoney and Frank Baumgartner are published extensively on this topic. Many of Dr. Baumgartner’s studies are available on his website. EU institutions are certainly more insulted than in the U.S. Whether or not this is good for democracy is debatable.

It is clear that there is room to increase the public’s confidence in government through increased transparency regarding lobbying in both the U.S. and the EU. With government bailouts of key sectors, both governments must take measures to distance themselves and illustrate clearly, through increased transparency, that they are not subject to capture. Distance and transparency will also help eliminate the problem of moral hazard that has not developed in bailed out industries.

Is lobbying a bad thing? Absolutely not, and increased transparency will show this by leveling the playing field for all organizations. Lobbying, interest representation and advocacy are here to stay and represent an integral part of democracy. Citizens’ initiatives account for the largest number of advocacy groups and play an important role in the legislative process, contrary to common belief. Both “good” and “bad” policies can be advocated for; it is simply in the eye of the beholder.

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[i] Mahoney, Christine. 2007. “Lobbying Success in the United States and the European Union.” European Union Politics: Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 35-56.

A bunch of unelected bureaucrats: Solving the democratic deficit

Last Friday, October 8^th myself and three JMU alumni attended a lecture at the Cato Institute entitled Power Grab: European Integration in the Post-Democratic Age. The panel consisted of the moderator Marian Tupy, a policy analyst at the Cato Institute ,Fritz Bolkestein former Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, Angelos Pangratis, Deputy Head of the EU delegation to the U.S. and John Gillingham, professor at University Missouri-St. Louis. The title of the lecture was controversial, and being at the Cato Institute, I knew I would hear a libertarian take on the EU, a perspective that I am unfamiliar with.

The forum began with Fritz Bolkestein, who made it clear that he become disillusioned with the EU. He made the argument that the EU is moving in the wrong direction with the Lisbon Treaty. Bolkestein pointed out that the European Council, where heads of state convene to determine big policy initiatives, has now become an official institution, which will significantly increase the already bloated bureaucracy. While he pointed out more specific problems, his main issue was with the Parliament and the lack of democracy in the EU. Bolkestein concluded stating that the EU is “a bunch of unelected bureaucrats.”

Dr. John Gillingham spoke last, but he made similar arguments to Bolkestein. Gillingham believes that the EU has spiraled out of control and become a government that does not serve its intended purpose. He believes that EMU has been disastrous and granting the EU fiscal powers will not remedy the recent crisis from happening again. The way to fix the EU is through structural reform that allows flexibility. This flexibility will come through bilateral treaties, which seems to stem from Andrew Moravczik’s theory of interngovernmentalism. Gillingham concluded that he does not know if this is possible, but there are things about the EU worth saving, like the single market, and therefore reform is necessary.

Dr. Pangratis faced tough opposition representing the EU. His defense was that the EU is necessary to govern the complexities of a modern world. If you compare the bureaucracies of the U.S. and the EU, the EU employs only 30,000 people, a fraction of the U.S. federal government, and more comparable to a state’s civil service. Gillingham refuted this by stating the EU does not provide services, like mail or building roads, that governments typically provide.  Pangratis acknowledged that the EU must address the democratic deficit.

You cannot discuss the EU without discussing the democratic deficit. So why hasn’t it been addressed? The Lisbon Treaty attempts to do this, and is mildly successful, although not to the critics. The Parliament and the Council now act similarly in most legislation as the House and Senate in the U.S, forming a bicameral legislature. And new citizens’ initiatives have been introduced, where a percentage of the populous can compel the Commission to introduce legislation. Going into all the mechanisms would be lengthy and has been written about extensively, so I will go into any more depth here.

As Bolkestein and many scholars point out, the Parliament has many inherent problems. Voter turnout has declined steadily since the first direct elections in the 70s. Voters also use these elections as “second order” elections, punishing or rewarding their domestic government. If they are unhappy with the Socialist government, voters will vote liberal in the Parliament elections, or for another party. So how can this be fixed? Peter Maier has pointed out that parties are no longer capable of representing the people of Europe. Simon Hix, who has also written extensively on the democratic deficit, believes there needs to be more direct democracy introduced, such as direct participation in electing the Commission president.

An idea that has constantly arose in my mind is, would changing the system of proportional representation to a system of single member district plurality introduce more direct democracy to the Parliament? I had the opportunity to ask both Peter Maier and Simon Hix this question. Maier believes that this could be a possible solution, while Hix does not believe that this will do much because districts would be so large and diverse.

I believe changing the system from proportional to single member district would not introduce democracy to the EU, but rather input legitimacy. The EU already possess a high amount of output legitimacy through the consensus that it reaches through its complex legislative process, there is usually no direct loser in European politics. It lacks input legitimacy, where citizens directly participate in government. This is a stark difference between the U.S. and the EU, where the U.S. has a high degree of input legitimacy, but low output legitimacy. The U.S. system is one of a winner takes all. When Republicans win, Republican policy measures benefit their supporters, and punish Democrats. The EU attempts to introduce legislation that is acceptable to all major parties.

How can the democratic deficit be fixed? By forgoing one type of legitimacy for another. Switching types of legitimacy would be a fatal blow to the integration process. Single member districts will introduce the problem of pork barrel and log rolling into the Parliament. Other measures to increase input legitimacy will allow more say from a largely Euroskeptic European public. Bolkestein is correct to point out that there is no opposition government in the Parliament, but polarizing the Parlimanet along party lines will lead to legislative gridlock or a system that benefits winning parties and punishes the losers, a far cry from the system of governance the EU has a become, a system based on consensus. Single member districts also tend to produce two party systems like in the U.S, while proportional representation allows for more parties to enter into the government.

So which type of legitimacy is “better?” This is the question. The idea of democracy is government by the people. This would lead one to believe that democracy has degraded in Europe because the average European has little direct influence on the supranational government. However, democracy with input legitimacy sometimes allows for some very undemocratic outputs. This is evident when an elected majority produces policy that punishes the minority. Both the U.S. and EU forms of governance have their flaws. Which system is better equipped with the tools to address the complexities of the modern world? Only time will tell, but European economies seem to be faring the current crisis better than the U.S.

Are you smarter than a 5th grader?

Are You Smarter than a Fifth Grader is a trivia game show that asks an adult questions with difficulty levels based on different primary school grade levels. If stumped, they can receive the assistance of children actually in those grades. Granted, the contestants are usually not America’s best and brightest, there is something to be said for the basic knowledge that is lost as we age. My ultimate goal is to determine the complete perception that average the American has about the EU, and this show actually offers some valuable insight.

If a contestant on the show was asked a question about the EU would he/she know it? Would the primary school student know? Neither most likely will. Recalling my primary and secondary education, where history and social studies quickly became my favorite subjects, I remember learning almost nothing about post-war Europe. Europe before World War II is still vivid in my mind, from the British Empire, back to the Renaissance, to Medieval Europe, all the way back to the Roman Empire. My history/social studies education ended with briefly covering the Cold War and Vietnam. European history up to WWII is so intertwined with America’s that it is impossible to teach American history without an understanding of Europe.  But then something happens. After WWII the Europeans choose to forge their own path and the continent all but disappears from American memory.  

Coming out of high school, I could’ve told you that I had heard of the European Union, but that’s it. This led me to look up the New Jersey Department of Education’s core curriculum for social studies. Located at here there is an impressive list of material that needs to be covered from grades 4-12. I was surprised to see the depth that the standards go into. They list some very specific topics, such as “explain the role of specialization in the production and exchange of goods and services” to be achieved by the end of grade 4. This standard shocked me. I did not learn about comparative advantage and economies of scale until taking Principles of Macroeconomics in college. 

Is there any mention of the EU in this very detailed list that ultimately shapes the lives of New Jersey’s youth? I was surprised that there was one mention:”Assess the impact of the European Union on member nations and other nations.” This appears in the category of 1945-Present. I was surprised at the depth of the standards in the post-war era, as this does not reflect my own educational experience. Strictly based on my personal experiences, I find most Americans to be experts on World War II, while their knowledge of contemporary issues lacks the depth of earlier historical events.

The lack of standards regarding EU material is merely an observation. I am not qualified, and definitely biased, to say that there should be more material taught on the EU. However, from my experience, I took all history courses rather than social studies; there was never a focus on contemporary issues. Why is this? Do more social studies and history teachers major in history rather than political science in college, and stick with their specialty? I understand the magnitude of material that must be taught to students is huge, covering all of human history.

Is this the correct focus however? To understand the present you have to understand the past. But should the focus be on the past at the opportunity cost (another standard to be taught by the end of grade 4) of examining the present? Can both be adequately covered? Does it matter since it appears we lose this knowledge rather quickly? Evident from the game show. I must stress that these observations come from my personal experiences. I encourage everyone to comment if they had a similar or different educational background. New Jersey’s core curriculum shows the lack of focus on contemporary Europe. Already handicapped by a lack of coverage of EU affairs by the American media, Americans suffer another handicap in understanding the continent through secondary education. What can and should be done?

Meet the Europeans: A Guide for Americans

We here in America like to think we know what's going on over there. Somewhere along the line, Europeans all decided it was high time they got a little cozier with their neighbors, trade in their currencies, and open their borders to each other... because they're just one continent of small car-driving, social welfare-loving people after all, right?

These are of course stereotypes and broad oversimplifications; ones that my American colleagues would likely agree dominate our sometimes critical and mostly romanticized notion of the European continent and those who live there. But who are they really-- and perhaps the better question is-- is there even a "they" to speak of?

The question of European identity is not just interesting to consider from a social or anthropological standpoint; in Europe the question is decidedly political and absolutely relevant to the future of the European Union and its stakeholders as a polity. The question is not new; conceiving of the limits of European integration and of shifting sovereignties has been of special interest to EU bureaucrats since the late 1980s and early 1990s, when European institutions took on many new areas of competency and the European Union began to be considered as something greater than an inner market. The anxiety-inducing topic of discussion in Brussels is that the European Union will-- if it hasn't already-- encounter its political and economic limits unless people start feeling European.

What's going on in Europe is a largely elite-driven experiment to see if truly, post-nationalism is possible. Some things are generally agreed upon-- the merits of an open and competitive European market, ease of travel, a common currency-- but where the EU stands on unstable ground is its ability to touch social issues. Of course, EU leadership is careful not to purposely step on any toes too soon, emphasizing in most Commission documents that edge in on aspects of social policy that core competencies are still delegated to the Member States under the principle of subsidiarity. It might surprise most Americans that most of the things Europeans can't seem to agree on have to do with state-run welfare, but on the other hand this makes sense: national welfare programs are expensive, politically sensitive, and vary widely.

The focus in most of the research and in the EU’s own attempts to monitor questions of identity and support for integration has been on a national basis in each Member State. Since 1973, the Eurobarometer surveys have been administered by the Commission twice a year in each Member State to examine trends in attitudes towards integration, looking at both shifting attitudes over time and differences between Member States in terms of their level of support. Drawing from a large body of data on attitudes towards the EU, European scholars and the EU institutions alike have shown considerable interest in identifying the national identity considerations factoring into support (or lack thereof) for the European project. Characterizing each nation by their level of support has been conceptualized in much of the literature as distinguishing between the nations of “Euroskeptics” and the nations of “Europhiles.”

But what is it that makes them quintessentially European nonetheless? Popular notions of Europe being a physical place is certainly troubled by its misty division from Asia and the EU's possible expansion to places that aren't really all that much on the European continent. The Roman empire itself included much of North Africa-- what makes some of the former empire popularly Europe and some of it decidedly not? There are debates that "Europe" exists along other lines such as the linguisitic, political, religious and cultural, but no theory really proves European identity to be a tangible, definable thing. Surely, democracy and the rule of law are important binding characteristics of the Member States of the European Union, but these exist elsewhere in the world and it's probably reasonable to suggest that the U.S. will not be offered EU membership anytime soon. 

So. Europe doesn't exist. Close down the blog. Debate over.

Unfortunately, this answer doesn't help anyone. The EU exists-- and exercises growing global economic clout-- even if the notions of Europe and what it means to be European are elusive concepts. There is something that makes them work together on a great number of things that are undeniably key to peace and stability among them. Even if we don't know what this is, in the U.S., it's crucial that we understand as much as we can about what's working and what isn't within its multi-level governance structure, what the Member States agree on and what they don't; only in this way will we really know what's going on over there... and be better prepared to 'meet the Europeans' on the foreign policy playing field.

Michelle Melton is a contributor to U.S. Watch on Europe and is a 2010 Master's degree recipient from James Madison University's European Union Policy Studies program based in Florence, Italy.